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Intellectual property (IP) can be defined as all the intellectual assets for which the law grants 
individuals or a company exclusive rights and protection against improper use by third parties 
(Rivette & Kline, 2000). Over the last two decades, intellectual-based assets have become  the main 
source of a firm’s competitive advantage (Teece, 2000). Protection of intellectual assets occurs 
through patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. Patents and licenses are the main object 
of transaction on technology markets. A patent is a set of exclusive rights granted by a government 
to a person or organization for a limited period of time in exchange for the regulated, public 
disclosure of an invention.  
Starting  in the nineties, the market for patents and licenses has burgeoned rapidly. Patents 
are revenue-generating assets and can increase companies’ market value. IBM, Texas Instrument 
and Intel are just a few examples of corporations that profited from licensing and selling patents. 
How does the patent market work and who are its main players? These questions are receiving an 
increasing amount of attention in the industrial organization and strategic literature (Arora, Fosfuri, 
& Gambardella, 2001a; Davis & Harrison, 2001) Generally, companies exploit their new 
knowledge internally or trade it with other partners. Internally, they can develop new products and 
processes directly through a nested set of patents and proprietary technologies. Companies can also 
trade their IP on secondary markets (Arora et al., 2001a). They might for instance license their 
patents or reassign their ownership rights to an interested third party (Chesbrough & Di Minin, 
2005). The development, acquisition and commercialization of IP assets can become a fundamental 
revenue creating component of a company’s business.  This is true in high-tech industries where 
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 established companies like IBM and Texas Instruments get a large share of their revenues and 
profits from IP commercialization (Jones, Norris, & Solomon, 2000; Sullivan, 1998). Other high 
tech companies, like Qualcomm and Rambus, base their entire business models on the exploitation 
of their IP assets (Tansey, Neal, & Carroll, 2005). In a variety of industries IP-based transactions 
play a key role in the business models of several firms (Chesbrough, 2003), both in high tech and 
low tech sectors (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006).  
This paper focuses on patent brokers and explores their role in the  technology market. 
Patent brokers are here defined as organizations whose business is to match supply and demand of 
technology and to facilitate IP-based transactions. In doing so they can serve a support function to 
R&D managers of firms adopting various approaches to technological change (Rush et al. 2007).  
Our first question is: what types of activity do patent brokers perform? Patent brokers work 
with market imperfections and correct information asymmetries. They do not develop new 
knowledge, carry out research and development, or patent their ideas. Patent brokers exploit a 
monopolistic and independent position, as they temporarily own information that is crucial for a 
transaction.  This not only redirects value from legitimate owners, but can also produce distortions 
on the markets. However, the presence of brokers can facilitate transactions with a win-win solution 
for both supply and demand. To consider the positive and negative effects brokers can have on 
patent markets, we need a thick description of their role and activities.  
Our second question is: why do patents’ brokers exist? We believe that such discussion is 
particularly relevant for the current debate on “Open Innovation” (Gassmann, 2006). There are 
many different theoretical explanations for why patent brokers exist, in particular we have found 
particularly useful the interpretation offered in Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2002). We here suggest 
that transaction cost economics and structural holes theory partly address the issue of why “third 
parties” play a role in economic and social exchanges. Transaction cost economics explains why 
specific transactions characterized by “incomplete contracts” require a third party to be completed. 
Structural holes theory suggests that untapped connections can be exploited by proactive actors. Drawing from these two theories and our own empirical evidence, we discuss the effectiveness of 
these theories in explaining patent broker existence. 
  This paper is organized into six sections. In the first section we discuss the increasing role of 
Intellectual Property (IP) in the modern economy. We briefly mention the  main factors that have 
led to a greater role of patenting in the past two decades. We then discuss  the specific aspects of IP  
that we believe are important in  understanding the emergence of patent brokerage. In the second 
section we review the literature and look for the theoretical explanations for patent brokerage. 
Specifically, we discuss how transaction cost economics and structural holes theory address the role 
of “third parties” in economic and social exchange. In the third section we discuss our empirical 
methods and then provide a “thick description” of what patent brokers do in the fourth section.  This 
analysis is based upon qualitative, exploratory research we conducted in the U.S. between June and 
September 2006. In the fifth section we offer a taxonomy of brokers’ activities. We argue that 
transaction cost economics and structural theory are only partially useful for explaining patent 
brokerage. In the sixth section we draw our conclusion and identify directions for future research 
both at a micro and macro level. At the micro level, we suggest that brokers can be treated as highly 
skilled entrepreneurs with relevant relational capabilities. At the macro level, we predict that 
structural conditions of the industry and technological field where patent brokers are active will 
impact the success and relevance of intermediaries activities.  
 1. THE INCREASING IMPACT OF PATENTS IN THE MODERN ECONOMY  
 
To understand where the phenomenon of patent brokers occurs, we need to explore three 
aspects of the IP system. 
The first aspect of patents worth considering is their exclusive nature.  A patent is a contract 
between the assignee and society. It establishes a quid pro quo which both facilitates the 
commercial exploitation of an invention and encourages the diffusion of knowledge that would 
otherwise remain eventually applied as an industrial secret. Technically, a patent grants the assignee 
a limited monopoly over some “claimed inventions” in exchange for the disclosure of the details 
that would allow a person “trained in the field” to reproduce the claimed invention. The law grants 
assignees the right to prohibit others from using or making the claimed invention. Moreover, 
assignees also have the right to dispose of their patents by granting licenses or reassigning these 
rights to other parties. These rights have a time limit, and as patents expire, knowledge and 
techniques become part of the public domain: anybody can get access to and apply them.  Patents 
grant the right to exclude. They do not grant the right to make. In fact, other preexisting patents, 
related to the claimed invention, might impede the use or commercialization of an invention. When 
products are complex, the possibility of patent infringement is high. In the high tech industry, not 
buying from companies with extensive IP means taking some amount of risk. If one finds they are 
infringing another company’s rights, they will have to pay extra money for settling the case 
(Chesbrough, 2003). Note that infringement of patents might occur  accidentally: companies cannot 
search and scrutinize all possible patents impacting their activity.  They might not know they are 
infringing a patent. If they know they might be infringing a patent, they have two options: getting a 
license over this patent or waiting for this patent to expire. Transactions occur when parties are 
willing to trade and are satisfied with the terms and conditions of exchange.  
The second aspect of the IP system is  major legislative shifts that occurred in Europe and in 
the U.S. during the 80’s and 90’s. These shifts have led to increasing enforceability and (consequently) greater value of IP assets. After the formation of a centralized appellate court in 
1982 (the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) in the U.S., the likelihood of winning a patent 
infringement case went up from 50% to over 70%. This institutional change paved the way to a 
“pro-patent” judicial period (Merges, 1992). In 1986 the “Kilby patent” decision set an important 
precedent in high tech industries, granting Texas Instruments a significant source of income and 
significant controlling power over the semiconductor industry (Grindley & Teece, 1997).  The 1989 
sentence in the Polaroid Vs. Kodak case showed that courts were not shy in setting high damage 
payments for a considerable infringement. Today multimillion settlements over infringements are 
not a rare occurrence; the $612 million paid by Research in Motion to NTP in order to settle a 
dispute over some patents that were supposedly infringed by the Blackberry device is only the latest 
example
2. In Western economies, the jurisprudence on patents is still in full swing, and deep 
reforms are quite possible. The direction of change is toward  increased patent protection.  During 
the course of the 90’s, the number of patents granted by the USPTO (U.S. Patents and Trademarks 
Office) increased at an unprecedented rate. Empirical studies are still providing contradictory 
explanations for  this surge in patenting. A new approach to management of innovation seems to be 
the primary driver across industries in the U.S., while the “friendly court” hypothesis, and the 
presence of more technological opportunities, or higher investment in R&D remain secondary, and 
industry specific, causes (Kortum & Lerner, 1999). Patents have become an effective tool to better 
appropriate the results of R&D, increase revenue, and gain contractual power through cross-
licensing agreements (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). Figure 1 provides data on patent applications and 
patents granted by the USPTO between 1980 and 2005. 
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Increased patenting is also the outcome of increasingly defensive strategies. Several 
companies began patenting to protect their products against possible infringements. These 
companies patented as many of their technologies as possible, and the result is  a significant amount 
of overlapping patents of questionable quality. More patents do not necessarily mean better patents. 
In fact, the quality of most of what companies across industries are patenting is of little or no 
commercial relevance and difficult to correlate with shareholder value (Hall, Jaffee, & Trajtenberg, 
2000). The percentage of granted patents that are going to be applied to products or enforced 
through licensing agreements does not reach double digits (Granstrand, 2004; Teece, 2000). 
Forward patent citations are often used as a proxy for patent usefulness. Distribution of patents’ 
citations is extremely skewed, as a small minority of extremely important patents are receiving most 
of the citations from subsequent patent documents (Hall et al., 2000). Citations do provide only a 
partial (ex-post) proxy of patent value. Interesting research is currently being conducted to better 
evaluate patent value starting from the use of technical words and the development of application 
procedures (Reitzig, 2004). With no standardized tools with which to gauge the value and potential 
usage of patents, browsing through an overcrowded technology market is indeed a difficult task and 
requires specialized know-how.  
The third aspect has to do with licensing practices. Recent evolutions in  patenting systems 
led to a growing separation between technology (and IP) providers, technology users, and 
integrators. Companies started to rely on the existence and functioning of a burgeoning market for 
proprietary technologies. Patents’ primary role as a defending mechanism for a firm’s proprietary technology took on a  new importance. Patents became valuable components of market exchanges 
and a key element in transactions such as licensing or strategic alliances.  
The surge in licensing revenues and patent sales was the consequence of some eye opening 
success cases. In some situations, as traditional resources for investment in R&D declined, leading 
companies turned to the licensing of their existent IP portfolio as a possible source of income. One 
of the most successful examples of this has been IBM, which as early as 1995 officially recognized 
licensing revenue as an important item in its budget. As patents became a valuable component of 
market exchanges, several companies realized they lacked expertise and resources to directly 
manage their patent portfolio. The same holds true for independent inventors. Independent inventors 
have limited resources and are not very likely to commercialize their technologies. Independent 
inventors can also experience problems getting crucial information about potential buyers and 
licensees. Transaction cost in dealing with companies can become unbearable.  
Universities and public research centers have also entered the patent business. Universities 
and public research centers are a significant source of potential patents. Since the approval of the 
Bayh Dole Act (1980), University Technology Transfer Offices (TTO) have significantly increased 
their presence in technology markets. The number of patents filed by university researchers has 
surged. This is also true of (repetitive construction) licensing agreements between universities and 
corporations (Markiewicz & Di Minin, 2004). 
More players are turning to patent transactions as a critical function for both their 
technology transfer and knowledge exploitation. While for some of these companies, institutions 
and individuals this represents the core of their business models, for others licensing is a secondary 
activity, and onlyone of the various forms of technology sourcing and new modes of exploitation 
for internally developed assets (Cesaroni, Gambardella, & Garcia-Fontes, 2004).  
 2. HOW DO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORIES EXPLAIN TECHNOLOGY 
BROKERAGE? 
 
Brokers are common in everyday economic life. Whenever we deal with buying, selling or 
renting a house, getting an insurance policy, or trade options and futures in the financial market, we 
rely on the services of a specialized agent.  This agent makes the transaction possible by 
guaranteeing both parties an acceptable solution among the available options. To do so, a broker 
might perform a variety of different tasks required for the completion of a transaction. Thus we can 
assume that under specific circumstances the transaction would not occur or would be much more 
difficult were a broker not present. Common sense suggests this might be true in several 
circumstances. Consider for instance the real estate market, where brokers gather, process and 
distribute information about possible deals at a low cost. In most cases, sellers would not be able to 
properly indicate their intentions, the conditions under which they want to sell, etc. due to an 
unfamiliarity with the market.   They would also likely be unable to pick up on the signals coming 
from prospective buyers. As a result, some market transactions would not occur even though both 
parties were present and wanting to close the deal. 
A common way to explain why brokers exist is to assume that markets and economic 
exchange are characterized by imperfections. If information were homogeneously distributed and 
freely accessible so that no asymmetries existed, perfectly rational agents would be able to complete 
transactions in their own interests without any assistance. Homogeneous information and perfect 
knowledge) would render the presence of a broker unnecessary. According to this view, brokers are 
a temporary, viable solution to existing imperfections. Still under these circumstances brokers might 
play a positive or negative role. Brokers are efficient as they offer a second best solution to agents 
on the market. Brokers can temporarily mitigate market imperfections and provide reliable, 
trustworthy information. They can also provide legal assistance and control for free-riding behavior. 
On the other hand, brokers might also represent an obstacle to market efficiency, as they could be a primary cause of information asymmetry. Brokers can convey limited information or hide relevant 
information.  Brokers may act opportunistically if their reputation is not at stake or if there are  
minimal rewards for playing fair (Merges, 1999). However, this type of brokerage is doomed to 
disappear as industry matures. As knowledge of the market diffuses, the bridging function of 
brokers looses its appeal. In theory, companies can skip the intermediaries and directly manage their 
transactions.  
Teece (2005) provided indirect support for patent brokers’ relevance by discussing the 
interplay between patenting, firms’ boundaries, and firms’ specialization. Building on an argument 
explored by Arora & Merges (2004; 2001b), Teece (2005) suggests that IP combined with 
complementary and proprietary assets allows companies to successfully leverage the results of 
innovation. In other words, patents might indeed encourage more dispersed sources of innovation; 
however, access to key complementary assets is going to determine the success or failure of an 
innovation. Knowledge of the industry as well as ownership of the essential IP are key ingredients. 
Companies might not have both at the same time, and some form of brokerage might be necessary. 
Moreover, as recently reinforced by Rush et al. (2007), firms hold different approaches to 
technological change, and for some of them, external help is necessary to identify opportunities and 
threats.  
Transaction cost economics (TCE) and structural holes theory don’t directly address the 
issue of patent brokers. Nevertheless, they provide a theoretical framework for understanding the 
role of brokerage.  
TCE views hierarchies and markets as two alternative governance modes to perform 
transactions (Williamson, 1975). Depending on asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty, 
hierarchies or markets are better off in performing transactions.  For instance, markets are better off 
in governing transactions on commodities. A commodity does not require high costs for collecting 
relevant price, setting up and reinforcing contracts. Transactions for commodities are usually 
standardized agreements, making switching costs negligible or absent. Companies are better off governing highly asset specific transactions. Hierarchy allows for a tighter control of opportunistic 
behavior. Making rather than buying avoids lock-ins, as in the case of a company relying on a non-
substitutable supplier.   
Transaction cost economics subsequently recognized that hybrid governance modes are also 
possible (Williamson, 1985).  Thus, while hierarchies and markets remain polar modes, other 
different governance structures are also possible. Trilateral governance is possible when 
transactions are occasional and of mixed and highly specific kinds. Third parties and intermediaries 
might play a role as they reinforce the institutional setting needed to make transactions happen: 
“thus rather than resorting immediately to court-ordered litigation – with its transaction-rupting 
features—third party assistance (arbitration) in resolving disputes and evaluating performance is 
employed instead” (Williamson, 1985: 75). TCE recognizes that the cost of contracting, enforcing 
the contract, and dealing with unforeseen circumstances varies significantly (Bailey & Bakos, 
1997). Brokers can match buyers and sellers, thus reducing the costs of searching. Brokers can also 
act as agents of trust. They can shield buyers and sellers, protecting them from opportunistic 
behaviors by other players.  
TCE offers a parsimonious explanation of why brokers exist. Brokers can help buyers and 
sellers in setting up appropriate governance modes to execute risky transactions. This is especially 
true in the case of patents, whose value is difficult to ascertain precisely and where several 
contingencies are at work. TCE maintains that brokers offer buyers and sellers an insurance policy 
against malfeasance in situations of incomplete contracts. Thus TCE implicitly equals brokers to 
regulatory institutions or substitutes for contractual regulations.  This way, brokers exist because 
transactions have specific features that cannot be governed through polar modes. According to 
TCE, brokers stay in the middle. Note that a TCE explanation of why brokers exist is compatible 
with the one offered by classic industrial organization (Tirole, 1988). As specialized agents, brokers 
can facilitate the market by reducing operative costs. They can benefit from economies of scale and 
scope and reduce bargaining asymmetry. TCE and industrial organization assign brokers a “bridging” function. Their role is to connect market players that want to engage in transactions but 
cannot do so efficiently on their own. The work of Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2002) tries to interpret 
the role of intermediaries in the market for technology through this lens. These two authors claim 
that the development of specialized markets allowed firms to “outsource” to professional 
individuals the “responsibility for developing and commercializing their invention”. If we apply the 
TCE/Industrial Economics view to patents’ brokers, we deduce the following proposition.  
TCE/Ind.Econ. Proposition: incomplete contracts explain the presence of patent brokers in 
between technology demand and supply. Patent brokers provide a hybrid form of governance for 
transactions on technology markets. 
An alternative view of brokerage comes from socio-economic theories. Burt (1992; 2005) 
suggests that brokerage is a function of structural holes in a network structure. While TCE suggests 
that intermediaries are “equidistant” from supply and demand, and they simply regulate an 
information asymmetry, network theories conceptualize brokers as proactive players. A structural 
holes exists when two people or groups are unaware of value available if they were to coordinate. A 
structural holes refers to a missing element of coordination. Structural holes imply resources are 
unevenly distributed. Distribution can be random or occur in densely knitted clusters. Within these 
clusters homogeneity is normally high. Individuals spanning several clusters are in the position of 
exploiting differences. People spanning structural holes are more likely to have good ideas. Bridge 
relations are the channels through which discussion changes opinions and behavior. Brokerage is 
the act of creating value by filling in the hole. 
In reviewing existing literature, Burt (2005) suggested two possible ways to control for 
effects of brokerage. One is to study returns to the people connected by brokers; the other is to 
study returns to the broker. Garmaise & Moskowitz (2003) studied the effect of brokers in the 
commercial real estate market and found that brokers substantially raised the probability that a 
transaction would be financed with a bank loan.  However, there is not compelling evidence that 
brokerage itself leads to success and superior business.  Network theories imply that brokerage is not a simple support function. Brokerage can be 
realized in several ways. Putting in contact two parties who share similar interests or could have 
common goals is one way. However, brokering is a complex and multidimensional activity, and 
information transmission is only one component of the broker’s role in orchestrating a deal 
(Pollack, Porac, & Wade, 2004). Brokers can transfer from a cluster to another best practices and 
routines. Also, brokerage can take the form of analogy and of synthesis. Thus brokers may add 
distinctive, unique value  (Hergadon, 1998). This is the case for example of internal brokers. 
Internal brokers share complex knowledge between very distant contexts in large organizations 
(Cillo, 2005). If we use structural holes theory to explain patent brokers, we formulate the following 
proposition. 
Structural Holes Proposition: structural holes explain the presence of patent brokers in 
between technology demand and supply. Patent brokers add value to a transaction, creating  a 
bridge between two previously disconnected groups of players on technology markets. 
 
In conclusion, we have two distinct explanations for why brokers exist and what they do. 
These theoretical approaches converge when considering asymmetries as a natural precondition for 
brokers’ existence. For TCE, asymmetries are embedded in transactions. Brokers facilitate market 
exchange by limiting their negative side effects.  For the structural holes theory, asymmetries exist 
between densely knitted cliques. By bridging these cliques, brokers leverage their position. 
Our field work aims to confirm or reject these two separate theoretical explanations of why 
patent brokers  exist. 
 
3. METHODS AND DATA  
 
Due to the exploratory nature of our research, we chose to take a case-study approach. A case study 
approach is beneficial because it creates a foundation on which to build new theories and to explore new phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989). This method was also  necessary due to the lack of public data 
about patent brokers and the scattered nature of information we were able to get from primary 
sources,  such as associations’ directories and existing databases. 
Our first task was to identify and select IP intermediaries. No comprehensive directory of 
patent brokers exists. We relied on secondary sources of information and used a snowball technique 
to build our sample. Through exploratory interviews with industry experts, key informants and TTO 
professionals we were able to come up with a tentative list of patent brokers. This first task proved 
to be quite straightforward. In an industry where relationships are key, knowledge about “who is 
who” is rather diffused at least among key players. Also, once we identified and contacted patent 
brokers, getting their feedback was facilitated by the fact that most of these companies were eager 
to share their view of the industry and discuss their business models. While confidentiality issues 
arose (as will be discussed below) many of the interviewees welcomed the opportunity for higher 
visibility. Biases of such an approach are inevitable. Less well-known companies did fall off our 
radar screen and we were unable to get information out of those companies still operating in stealth 
mode. Nevertheless, the convergence of opinions expressed in the course of semi-structured 
interviews allows us to be confident about the general validity of results here described. 
Through the process of snowballing and conducting interviews between May and September 
2006, we were able to identify, select and collect non-confidential information from 15 companies. 
Only two firms were unavailable for comment. Table 1 lists interviewed companies included in this 
study. We believe they represent a satisfactory representation of the larger universe of U.S. 
intermediaries. 
 
TABLE 1. Interviewed Companies 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------  
For each company we interviewed one of the partners or top managers. Interviews were in person 
and lasted between one and two hours. Each interview was reviewed and edited with the feedback 
we got from the interviewees. In several cases we did a second interview to discuss specific topics 
more in depth. 
Our second task was to come up with a clear understanding and possibly a “thick 
description” of what patent brokers really do. Interviews were divided in two parts. In the first half 
we discussed general market and business trends to get an overall understanding of the industry. In 
the second part we asked specific questions about the company, i.e., its origin and foundation, area 
of specialization, activities carried out, examples of specific deals, and financial performances. 
Whenever possible we double-checked the information we got and asked respondents to give us 
their view on other respondents’ comments. 
Informants were very cooperative on every issue except financial performances. None of the 
informants provided us detailed figures about revenue and profits, paralleling the privacy normally 
observed in the venture capital industry. Due to the nature of business, yearly revenue might be 
inaccurate or non significant. Very few of the 15 companies have managed to secure a stable and 
secure base for their revenue stream, and as one of the informant stated, “it takes several times to 
finalize very complicated agreements, and sometimes even more (..) as a consequence yearly figures 




Ten out of fourteen of the patent brokers in our sample were founded after 2000. Half of 
them are headquartered on the East Coast, and the other half in California, namely Silicon Valley. 
While the reader might think that this is the result of convenience sampling, as we searched the area 
where we were physically located at the time, we were told that Silicon Valley and California are home to a large population of patent brokers. If one thinks about the concentration of high-tech 
industries in these areas, it makes perfect sense that patent brokers would be localized mostly near 
the companies they will work with. Also, the dot com boom of the 90s and bust of the early 2000s 
left a high concentration of unexploited IP up for grabs among the ruins of many failed start-ups. 
Only  three of the fourteen cases we examined appear to be a continuation of pre-existing 
activities. However, partners and founders have been around for longer periods of time. Consistent 
with Chesbrough (2006) we found evidence of significant innovation in the business models 
described to us, and various entrepreneurial solutions have been explored by these companies. We 
here try to stratify our sample into four different “value creation” paths.  
The first path to venture creation was an inventor willing to leverage his or her own 
experience in patenting. This is the case for instance of Science+Technology, whose founder 
experienced several problems trying to  leverage his own inventions in video-games and then turned 
to the brokering business. Realizing how problematic it was to extract value from a patent and get 
support for marketing, he founded a company that engaged in a variety of commercialization and 
support functions that need to be carried out after the patent has been granted, such as market 
evaluation, product design, and product commercialization. According to the founder of 
Science+Technology, “we realized there were inventors willing to develop their patents. They were 
technically very skilled but totally lacked commercial and marketing expertise. We decided there 
was a market for patents held by individuals that was worth exploring.” 
The second path to venture creation was professionals and managers with deep knowledge 
and experience in IP management at large corporations who decided to spin-off and establish their 
own firm. This is the case of Intellectual Ventures. One of its founders used to be a senior manager 
and key technologist at Microsoft. Having perceived that there were opportunities to explore, he 
teamed up with other professionals to leverage his previous knowledge and contacts. Intellectual 
Ventures is today a specialized IP broker that aggregates and manages underutilized patents. The third path to venture creation was lawyers and professionals who teamed up with 
business colleagues to offer integrated services. This is the case, for instance, of Inflexion Point 
Strategy. These companies  are usually the outcome of partnerships among experienced individuals 
who decide to team up and become independent patent brokers, and in so doing raise enough capital 
to finance their operations. Pre-existing ties and common background turn out to be, in some cases, 
very beneficial, as one of the informants clearly states, “we had common background in high-tech 
and were very complementary… as soon as we realized we wanted to experience an entrepreneurial 
career, teaming up looked natural.” The experience of large multinational companies, public 
centers and universities provided the foundation for dealing with patents and offered risk-seekers an 
opportunity to start their own company.  
The fourth path to venture creation was bold entrepreneurial activities backed by large 
financial resources. This is the case for instance of IP Value Management. IP Value Management is 
backed up by the capital of important institutional partners such as General Atlantic Partner and 
Goldman Sachs. Another example is the already cited Intellectual Ventures. Contrary to the vast 
majority of patent brokers we interviewed, Intellectual Ventures directly owns its traded assets. 
Even if the company would not comment on the size of its patent portfolio, nor on the identity of 
the investors, business press insists that Intellectual Ventures managed to aggregate and control 
thousands of patents within a few years and that its operations are financed by companies such as 
Microsoft and Intel. 
Degree of sectoral specialization among patent brokers varies. Some of them – roughly half 
of our sample – are mainly focused on technologies used in one or two industries. This is clearly the 
case of very complex industry, like electronics, IT or biotech, where patents are key in protecting 
knowledge in several domains, and where integration of various technologies, often in the hands of 
different companies, is a necessary step towards product development and commercialization of an 
electronic gadget or a drug. Specialization remains rather high for patent brokers who spun-off from 
larger companies. For the rest of our sample, specialization is not a crucial issue. These patent brokers cover several segments of high-tech industries and sometimes also mature ones. In these 
situations, key competitive advantage is given by a bundle of activities such as patent evaluation, IP 
identification, and value extraction.  
We found only two patent brokers with operations in Europe, and a third one who is about to 
open its offices overseas. Although all patent brokers are giving Europe and other areas serious 
consideration, they also suggest that the U.S. market is extremely rich in opportunities and remains 
their priority for the next future.  
If we consider only the companies that decided to disclose quantitative information about 
their operations (6 out of 12) the average size is around 20 employees. Since most of the companies 
were not able to provide us data about the volume of their operations, it is not possible to estimate 
the share of patent transactions that are served by these companies and in general we cannot 
speculate on how representative this sample is of the entire population. Most of the companies are 
privately owned and decided to share information about the sources of their funding only under 
condition of anonymity. In most cases, we learned that traditional venture capital firms, big 
investment banks, and large high tech companies are heavily financing some of the most well 
known intermediaries. Only a few companies claimed to rely exclusively on seed capital from their 
founders and individual partners.  
All informants agreed that brokerage in general has become more common and that the IP 
market is growing. Informants did not provide an estimate of the global market, and they were very 
circumspect in exploiting their specific markets. However, commenting on their customers’ needs, 
patent brokers in our sample identified three distinct drivers triggering growth in the IP market. 
The first factor that appears to trigger the creation of a patent market is increasing patent 
intensity, an observation that is consistent with available data. As the market grows, it becomes 
possible to trade patents as any other goods. Already discussed institutional factors, as well as 
deliberate company strategies, ultimately drove these changes. Thus, the existence and development 
of a market for patents provides a common ground for specialized players – other than buyers and sellers. As the market grows, it becomes more and more difficult to monitor all possible patents that 
might impact a company’s business. As one of the informants put it, “available public information 
is not enough (..) public data must be complemented by a deeper analysis and an overall 
understanding of the context (..) the patenter, its strengths and weaknesses, as well as the 
prospective buyer stakes and interests, all become relevant.” Consistent with what might be 
expected, development of the market for patents implies a general need for up-to-date, reliable and 
customized information. The variety of the information required is great. For instance, a company 
might want to know whether a specific patent exists, who the owner is, and whether or not the 
owner is willing to license or sell it. Similarly, a company and even an individual who has patented 
an innovation may want to know whether a company is infringing its patent rights. Some of our 
informants suggested that one of the first brokerage activities in the United States was a directory 
listing key information on the most relevant patents
3. However, it is more than a simple matter of 
“publishing information.”  
The second factor that appears to trigger the creation of a patent market is what we label 
“increasing compelling IP blindness.” As technology evolves at a faster pace and becomes more 
convergent, companies pursuing innovative strategies might violate other companies’ rights. This is 
the case because time-to-innovation and time-to-market are much shorter than the whole process 
needed to file a patent and to have it granted. As a result, companies might end up unintentionally 
violating existing patents. As one of the informant stated, “infringing a patent can occur 
inadvertently… companies developing an innovation cannot know for sure whether or not they are 
infringing existing patents.” 
No matter how many resources they commit to IP management, companies cannot monitor 
all possible innovators. Therefore, patent brokers might be better at scouting the market for patents. 
This is especially true for patents that have been filed but not yet granted. Such information is 
crucial for a company willing to buy a specific patent. The same holds true for a small company that 
                                                 
3 Interview with Scott Taper (Science+Technology). depends on R&D and whose main asset is IP. It is unlikely that such a company would be able to 
set aside resources for investigating who is infringing its patent, nor would it have the expertise to 
negotiate an agreement where technical, business and legal issues converge. 
The third factor that appears to trigger the creation of a patent market is that patents and IP 
management in general have become part of company strategy and sometimes one of companies’ 
core revenue stream. Such an increased attention to IP management by medium and large 
companies does not necessarily imply only in-house solutions. Large companies staffed with IP 
management practices might need consulting services from specialized companies. As one of the 
informant put it, “we have contacts and knowledge outside the industry we mainly do business 
with(..) so every time there is a patent with a possible application in several domains, we are 
requested to do “business and technical due diligence to assist our client.” At the same token, 
small-medium companies that lack needed resources must rely on external services to protect and 
value their patents. It is not usually the case that small-medium companies have a specialized 
internal unit; they do not patent on a regular basis, and patenting is not supposed to be one of their 
main activities.  
  Patent brokers in our sample are mostly specialized either in licensing or in selling.  
 
TABLE 2. What patent brokers do 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
Licensing makes sense when original assignees are seeking to obtain a continuous revenue 
stream, but lack the resources or have difficulty accessing the complementary assets necessary to 
invest in the commercialization of these technologies. For established companies, licensing out 
internally developed technologies can represent the lightest form of business diversification.  Negotiation between licensor and potential licensees can be tricky, but common standard and 
general formats offer a solid base for finding mutually acceptable solutions. Licensors normally 
grant rights to manufacture and/or distribute their originally assigned inventions in exchange for a 
percentage of total sales.  
Patent brokers intervene in licensing through (1) IP asset evaluation (2) market identification and 
selection  and (3) negotiation.  
During the first phase, IP assets are analyzed on technical, business and legal bases. Initial 
evaluation is normally followed by a more detailed analysis in order to understand the real market 
potential. As one of the interviewed managers stated “inventors normally overestimate the potential 
of their patents and underestimate costs associated with turning patents into a prototype or a 
product.” 
Patent brokers develop a detailed analysis of the patent potential by relying on a knitted web 
of professionals. These professionals are normally key-players in their area of expertise. Scientists 
and technical experts normally carry out a technical evaluation of the patent. They make sure that 
patents are truly innovative from an industrial point of view and give advice on how to define 
commercial solutions building from the technology that patents read on. Market consultants and 
business experts perform a market due diligence .They assess market potential for the product, its 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as potentially interested licensees. IP lawyers scrutinize the 
patent and its claims to assess whether or not the title has all the needed legal prerequisites for being 
licensed or commercialized. Patent brokers normally directly perform these activities in situations 
where inventors are individuals or small companies. When inventors are large companies, brokers 
normally assist internal units to perform these activities. 
Several interviewees suggested that teamwork, which combines internal resources with 
external ones, is extremely critical during this phase. The wider and more reliable their net of 
experts, the more reliable the final assessment will be and the smoother the whole process will go. 
As an outcome of this phase, a patent gets bundled with an overall technical, business and legal evaluation. Patent brokers also take care of selecting a qualified group of potential licensees, and 
they enter in negotiation for a potential deal. The majority of the interviewees claimed that 
“evaluation lies at the core of our business model.” One manager, who was specialized in managing 
entire IP portfolios on behalf of customers, claimed that “Our most important trade secret is how 
we scrutinize a patent portfolio and identify its strengths and potentials.” 
Selection and negotiation also have the potential to be extremely high value adding 
activities.  Whether a potential licensor is going after a quick return for an isolated invention or a 
healthy revenue stream for a large bundle of patents, the identification of the right licensee is 
critical for the success of the operation, since normally licensing revenue will be tied to the sales of 
products “reading on” the licensed IP assets.  
Relational capital and knowledge of possible future markets are going to make the 
difference in the eyes of the broker’s client. The first important assignment in this stage is to 
identify which industry is going to be interested in this technology, and to market it accordingly.  
This is often a difficult task because the market for the technology is not clear, or may be quite 
distant from the traditional market where the company operates. The ability to connect distant 
markets is therefore often a “creative effort that is required by my company,” as one of the 
interviewees put it.  
  In licensing, patent brokers are therefore acting as business developers. Sometimes they 
have to envision a new market for a new product, bring to the table both inventor and licensee, 
mobilize other resources and provide market and business intelligence to have the deal closed. One 
of the interviewees put it this way: “developing a business plan that makes sense out of a patent is 
sometimes a very demanding job(..) luckily it is also very creative and challenging, as success 
depends not only on how robust and advanced the patent is (..)sometimes the rest is as important.” 
And in this “rest” lies the core of the broker’s business. While the first cases of IP intermediaries 
were doing little more than bridging informational divides, the professionalization of IP brokerage 
led them to provide a more complete package of services in assisting a licensing transaction.   Licensing can also be the end result of a very different process. Instead of playing in the 
middle, a patent broker can also become representative of the inventors. Patent brokers’ main task is 
to control whether or not other companies are infringing the inventors’ IP. Infringement is common 
and therefore “patent trolling” has become a very prolific, and profitable, niche. In this case, patent 
brokers, but more often lawyers, assist inventors to make sure they can benefit from the output of 
their innovation. Assistance requires a deep understanding of a patent in its technical, business and 
legal aspects, as well as a deep knowledge of the companies of a specific industry. Assessing 
whether or not an existing company is violating a patent is not an easy task by any means. A threat 
to sue a company must be credible and patent brokers can effectively assist individuals and small 
companies to make their threat believable. Licensing and settlement are the ending point of this 
process, where legal skills are predominant. Also, the boundary between a genuine infringement 
allegation and a frivolous charge is not always an easy one to draw. Some patent brokers have 
gained the undesirable reputation of being “IP Trolls,” meaning that their main purpose is to get a 
quick payment by spamming dozens of established companies with infringement claims of dubious 
strength.   
When patent brokers assist companies seeking to reassign their patents, they operate in ways 
similar to what we have discussed in the case of licensing. We can distinguish the assistance 
brokers give when aiding supply or demand of technology. When working together with a 
technology provider the identification of the best possible buyer is critical for the maximization of 
the price that the potential user is going to be able to pay.  
When intermediaries assist buyers, which are scanning the market for possible acquisitions 
of third party’s technologies, they can perform a special “shielding” function. They guarantee 
anonymity by keeping prospective buyers’ signals from being sent across the market. As one of the 
interviewees stated, “companies are worried not to let competitors know what they are after(..) they 
prefer closing deals in the dark.” They also avoid closing deals in which the price is high only 
because the prospective buyer is a large company; “sometimes it is so difficult to assess the real value of a patent that people use rules of thumb like a fixed percentage of the total revenue of the 
buyer,(..) but when large companies are involved inventors become greedy and ask for unrealistic 
compensations(..) Patent brokers can help assess a right value.” 
The need for anonymity and even more so a marketplace for tradable IP is the catalyst 
behind patent brokers’ evolution from information to complete service providers.  
Patent auctions have so far registered mixed success and most of the interviewees confirm 
general skepticism about the future of auction based companies. Nevertheless, the arguments 
offered by proponents of such a vision are rather compelling. Patents, much like commodities and 
stocks, will soon require their own exchange place, where supply and demand meet in the most 
efficient way. According to one of the respondents, “investing in a patent can be a more 
transparent form of investment than buying stock of a company. When you buy a valid patent, you 
invest in the future of a technology, and if the market for technology is efficient, this technology will 
find its most appropriate adopter.” 
Patent brokers representing buyers can also scout the market on a continuous basis to select 
patents the buyer might be willing to acquire. Reasons might be different and not necessarily 
“aggressive”, as for example when a patent is needed to enter a new market. Companies might also 
be willing to buy patents for defensive reasons, like to prevent competitors from threatening 
infringement charges. Companies might prefer to leave patents in their archives and avoid 
unnecessary risks. In this case, patent brokers add their knowledge both in terms of industry and 
process. They not only have to be very knowledgeable about a specific industry, but must also know 
how to collect and control useful information about patents acting as antennas on a specific market. 
This antenna role often cannot be directly performed by large companies. As one broker puts it “due 
to our reputation we can collect critical information without revealing how we will be using it (..) 
we have a net of informants that is very large and very reliable (..) we can also approach inventors 
and propose them a deal without revealing whom are we working for.” Here we encountered the evolution of yet another model of brokers: brokers that attempt to 
facilitate the aggregation of IP to create platforms to be licensed or assigned to companies seeking 
to make sure that they can build their proprietary technologies from a sound and secure base. The 
final results can be an aggregation similar to the result of the work of a standardization committee, 
and indeed the organization of some standard setting bodies can be considered a form of IP 
intermediation. The numbers of actors solicited to define these platforms can be significant, ranging 
from the single inventor to large patent holders and universities, and the generality of the 
technology extremely broad. Moreover, some patent brokers, often blessed with extremely deep 
pockets, are attempting to build private platforms that would completely alienate original assignees 
from eventual future licensing revenue. These companies work on the assumption that the value of a 
portfolio of patents around a technology is much higher (and much more enforceable) than the sum 
of the value of single and separated patents. As they acquire and combine patents in technology 
platforms, IP aggregators submit to the patent office continuations and divisions of the original 
patent titles to architect a portfolio which would grant them a much stronger “right to exclude” 
other companies to use a specific technology. While the promoters of these [private] platforms are 
claiming that their action will encourage dispersed innovation and facilitate technology transfer, 
both policy makers and most of the other intermediaries see the potential threat of a strong 




Patent brokers’ origin and growth is largely accounted for by the factors we have mentioned 
above. Interviews confirmed that increasing patent density, increasing compelling IP blindness, and 
IP as part of the companies’ business model have contributed to the growth and diffusion of patent 
brokers. Patent brokers are not all alike;  they differ substantially according to the way they make IP 
transactions possible. Many models do and will coexist. The picture we walk away with is an 
extremely rich one, and this section attempts to provide the reader with an overview of an industry 
that we believe is still in full swing.  
Two variables are helpful in understanding patent brokers and differentiating their business 
models.  The first variable is how much value they add to patents. Patents’ value has two 
components, one intrinsic and one “context-specific.” The intrinsic component could be measured 
in an ideal auction, where bidders would consider only the nature of the technology and the essence 
of the claims on the patent document, in determining how much they would be willing to pay for a 
reassignment or a licensing agreement. The “context-specific” component is the value companies 
attach to patents when they use them for defensive or offensive reasons, no matter how much 
money they can directly extract. This is the case of a patent that a company can buy on the open 
market in order to prevent a competitor from having it. Clearly, the amount of money paid for the 
patent only partially reflects the “true,” objective value of such an asset. What we observe on the 
secondary markets of technologies are transfers whose value is based on the combination of both 
the intrinsic and the context specific components. 
The value that patent brokers add to patents varies.   At one extreme, little value is added 
when the role of the broker is limited to the “pre-market” stages.  An example of this is a consulting 
law firm that helps a company or an individual file a patent or extend a patent in a foreign country. 
While this is an important function,  the patent broker in this case only covers a small section of all 
the activities that have to be performed so that the patent produces value. At the other extreme, we 
might have a patent broker that builds portfolios of patents. They might target the most promising 
scientific and technological domains, bring together inventors, get ideas and suggestions from them, 
control for the legal aspects, file patents and commercialize them in different formats. Clearly,  the 
value added in this case is more substantial.   The second variable that can be used to differentiate brokers’ activities is commitment in the 
transaction. Commitment has two components. The first depends on whether or not payment is 
dependent on performance. . For example, if patent brokers take an upfront fee, their commitment 
to close the deal is limited. If, however, a “success fee” is the only way they will be paid back, their 
commitment will be high. The second component has to do with the investment a patent broker is 
willing to make and the risk he/she is willing to take in a transaction.  A patent troll who enforces 
patents in only one industry and sends a large number of infringement letters, for instance, is only 
putting his/her reputation on the line (if that), thus bearing a very moderate risk. On the other hand, 
a patent broker that invests his/her own capital and specializes resources to make a deal would bear 
a high level of risk. 
These two variables, “value added” and “commitment”, identify four different categories of 
patent brokers, as expressed in Figure 2. We will now describe each of the four quadrants and 
discuss how TCE and structural holes theory, presented in section 2, fit in. 
 
FIGURE 2. A typology of patent brokers 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
The lower left category is consultants. Companies often use consultants in patents 
intermediation. Consultants are normally retired managers or professionals knowledgeable about 
specific domains. These consultants often come from law consulting firms that did not want to add 
business and market services to their portfolio. Consultants might provide companies fresh and 
reliable information, suggest contacts, and give advice about how to proceed. Consultants rely upon 
their personal networks. They have been with the industry for years, are knowledgeable about 
existing companies and can easily search among start-ups. Although their contribution might become relevant -- as in the case of skilled consultants who are assigned full responsibility of a 
patenting process by a company – consultants normally add little value. Consultants act on a 
personal basis. They do not usually mobilize or invest large resources. Their knowledge of the 
market and  familiarity with companies is normally limited to specific geographic areas. 
Consultants’ commitment to a transaction is also limited. Unless consultants take on other roles, 
they do not take up an entrepreneurial role and are normally paid by flat fees, sometimes associated 
with variable incentives. IP consultants match the expectations of the TCE proposition. They 
facilitate transactions characterized by incomplete contracts. They keep an equidistant position 
between supply and demand of patents. 
The second category, in the lower left quadrant, is patent brokers acting as “shields” to 
protect  potential buyers’ identities.  Buyers do not want to be visible for several reasons. First, they 
don’t want to send signals to the market and to competitors, which would threaten their strategic 
processes. Buyers  prefer invisibility, at least in the early stage of transactions, so as to prevent the 
price of a possible deal from skyrocketing due to their reputation or market power. Under these 
conditions, patent brokers provide such invisibility by acting as shields. Shields are not very 
committed to the transaction and their contribution  doesn’t go beyond the contractual phases of the 
deal.  Prospective buyers do most of the job; they identify hot technological areas, search for 
competitors’ activity and possible start-ups and analyze the potential impact of the patent both from 
a business and market viewpoint. Shields also take limited risks, as they leave the  field early in the 
game. Structural holes theory is indeed very appropriate to understand patent brokers in their role as 
“shields”. When patent brokers act as shields they are not “equidistant” from demand and supply; 
they benefit the party that seeks to exploit information asymmetry in the patent market. As stated in 
our structural holes based proposition, patent brokers create a bridge between two previously 
disconnected groups of players in technology markets.  
The third category is formed by patent promoters. Both propositions are insufficient to 
explain the activities performed by this type of intermediaries. Prospective customers for these  brokers are companies already established in a specific market that want to consolidate or widen 
their IP portfolio or protect their position against hostile moves. These companies are not interested 
or are  unable to perform a detailed scan of the market and sometimes lack the technical expertise to 
evaluate the exact trajectory of a specific technology. Patent promoters act on behalf of companies 
that are either interested in acquiring patents or are trying to capitalize on some of their unexploited 
IP. Patent promoters are more autonomous and creative than  shields. They may,  like shields, 
protect the identity of buyers to some extent, but their main value added is a more informed and 
imaginative knowledge of potential “downstream” markets for a particular technology. Patent 
promoters  are potentially instrumental in helping a market or a technology grow.  Without patent 
promoters, small companies and start-ups that have filed promising patents would have a hard time 
collecting all complementary resources needed to turn a patent into a product or even beginning the 
process.  By scanning the market and investigating  new technologies, patent promoters can act as 
“connectors” between previously unconnected actors. Foreign or large multi-product companies 
might need their services when they seek to understand the key issues of an industry they are not 
familiar with before diversifying into it.  However “structural holes” are not a precondition for 
paten promoters, as they might end up suggesting licensing contracts between two mutually known 
companies. The structural holes proposition is therefore not always verified in this case. The TCE 
proposition is also insufficient. Incomplete contracting is indeed part of the picture, but patent 
promoters “play in the middle,” in the sense that they do not always respond to the specific requests 
of customers. They might have a high degree of autonomy, and be extremely entrepreneurial in 
suggesting that potential  customers pay attention to specific scientific and technological areas. 
Compared to consultants and shields, IP promoters  add more “context specific” value and their 
commitment to the transaction is also higher, as they usually get rewarded through success fees.  
In the lower right quadrant we find patent evaluators. In this case, brokers take the role of 
consultants for both parties. This happens not because buyer and seller (or licensor and licensee) 
lacks the expertise needed to evaluate a patent, but because both of them need a third, specialized and possibly neutral opinion. The  role of patent evaluators is delicate, as a clear, standard 
methodology for evaluating patents does not exist. Each patent is by definition “unique” so that 
assessment and evaluation require specialized skills. This role is especially critical during mergers 
and acquisitions, as patents are often the most attractive assets for possible buyers. Under these 
circumstances, patent brokers provide assistance and facilitate the flow of the market. Patent 
evaluators add value to the extent that they provide specific knowledge. Patent evaluators don’t add 
much value if they only perform a “hands-off evaluation”. Patent evaluators might add high 
“context specific” value if they provide specific knowledge to the transaction, or use unique, 
innovative internal evaluation processes. Patent evaluators bear some risk because their reputation 
is on the line when wrong evaluations are produced. This category is  largely  consistent with the 
TCE proposition. IP evaluators complete contracts. They make transactions possible. However, they 
act in extremely densely connected environments. This contradicts the structural holes proposition. 
Also, patent deal makers (5) and patent aggregators (6) happen in extremely densely 
populated industries. These types of intermediation, however, are more than completing contracts,  
as they are both characterized by high value added and high risk-taking. Patent deal makers are 
brokers that complement patents with various services. They might carry out preliminary scientific, 
technical and business investigations to assess the potential of a patent.  They might also develop a 
component or a product, at least as prototypes or find possible customers or directly build up a 
knitted web of partners to do the whole job. Patent deal makers are therefore highly involved and 
they add high intrinsic and context specific value to the patents. The same holds true for patent 
aggregators. They help developing patents that they will acquire in order to build portfolios or 
platforms of intellectual capital. This strategy is risky, as it requires a high volume of financial 
resources. Pay back might be difficult and materialize only in the long run. However, by building 
portfolios of patents in specific domains, these brokers are in the position of adding high, unique 
value. For the reasons mentioned above, neither TCE nor structural holes propositions is not 
sufficient to explain the presence of this type  of intermediaries.  The last category is formed by patent  enforcers. Patent  enforcers work for individuals and 
small-medium companies. Their role is to protect inventors who patented their inventions against 
possible infringement. Their role is exclusively to increase the “context specific” component of 
patent value,  scouting out and acting on possible infringement scenarios. Infringements might be 
the result of  contractual power imbalances that often exists between an isolated patent holder and a 
large, powerful  company violating his or her patent. Patent enforcers can help balance the power 
structure in this situation by stepping in to defend the patent holder. Risk for patent enforcers is 
limited, but they add high value by helping their customers to extract hidden value from their 
patents. The more a patent has strategic and competitive impact on the products or technology of 
the violating company, the more IP enforcers can help capture this hidden value
4.  Patent enforcers 
simply help capture and redirect value in the markets for patents. TCE and structural holes 
propositions are not fully suitable to understand this type of intermediation 
We therefore conclude with our own proposition, suggesting that: even in very dense 
environments, the bridging role of IP intermediaries is that of market-makers, who leverage their 
specific investment to “play in between” technology demand and supply. 
  
                                                 
4 The aggressive attitude of some of the intermediaries in this category led the press and scholars to 
talk about the phenomenon of “patent trolls,” Patents’ brokers who sue or simply threaten to sue for 




The appropriability strategies of companies are changing (Pisano, 2006), and in a new -often 
more open- approach to innovation and technology transfer, the role of intellectual property 
intermediaries has gained momentum.  
Our contribution is twofold. First, we have presented reasons why patent brokers emerged 
and why they are likely to expand. A more prolific scientific and technological environment, and a 
more favorable judicial one, paved the way for patent brokers as specialized companies. This 
emerged also as a consequence of a changed approach to innovation management of companies. In 
this article, we have explained their origins and what trends have reinforced their presence.  Since 
various literature has explained brokerage, we sought to find an explanation of patent brokerage in 
transaction cost economics and structural holes theory. Our empirical study finds only partial 
evidence in support of the propositions derived by these schools of thought, and we therefore derive 
our own proposition, suggesting that: even in very dense environments, the bridging role of IP 
intermediaries is that of market-makers, who leverage their specific investment to “play in 
between” technology demand and supply. Our research setting was limited to USA and specifically 
California, and this was not by chance. We believe patent brokers tend to emerge and be co-
localized in highly innovative areas. The reasons are simple. Patent brokers have been up to now 
small-medium companies with limited resources. They mostly rely on personal contacts and close 
relationships. This is a common trait in business life, but in the patent market this is even more 
critical. Patent holders, prospective licensors and prospective buyers need to work out their 
relationship in such a way as to find a mutually satisfactory equilibrium. Patent brokers are 
fundamental in this respect. By building trust, understanding each party’s requirements and by collecting the needed resources, patent brokers can become “market makers.” Becoming a market 
maker is more likely in highly specialized innovative areas.  
 
Our second contribution is that we have provided a first, vivid picture of patent brokers. We 
here go beyond the intuition in Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2002), suggesting that they do not simply 
offer companies an outsourcing solution for their business development. Patent brokers engage in a 
wide spectrum of activities.  We mapped them here according to the value they add to transactions 
and their level of commitment. Patent brokers do not just stay in the middle and connect two 
previously disconnected parties by introducing and so bridging an information divide. Instead, 
patent brokers can and do play in between, knowing that patents are a potential resource. A patent 
might lead to huge profits or it might expire generating no results. A patent represents the beginning 
of a process that involves different actors, and it is ultimately only an input to the innovative 
process. Patent brokers can appropriate a high proportion of returns on the innovative investment, 
because they provide an indispensable contribution to the overall process. Although patent brokers 
often team up with a buyer or seller, they can and do play their own game according to their own 
specific interests. Some brokers actively seek opportunities and are able to engineer bold bridges 
with distinctive features. All together, patent brokers are a rich laboratory that is worth exploring. 
Figure 2 provides a taxonomy of different types of brokerage.  
We suggest that there are various avenues of research that can be explored. In particular, we 
approached this phenomenon from a perspective suggested in Teece (2005). While such a viewpoint 
remains useful in explaining the distribution and combination of innovative labor, it hardly 
recognizes the presence of entrepreneurial risk and skills of technology intermediaries. Other 
literature on technology entrepreneurship (see here the theoretical frameworks presented in: Gans 
and Stern, 2003 and Stuart and Sorenson, 2003) is providing tools for exploring high-tech 
entrepreneurship, and it might be fruitful to connect these two streams with this analysis of technology intermediaries. Finally, both practitioners and policy makers are in need of a definitive 
answer on how beneficial patent intermediaries are to the facilitation of high-tech transactions.  FIGURES AND TABLES 
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 TABLE 1. Interviewed companies 
 
Capital Value Partners  
Inflexion Point  
Intellectual Ventures  
IP Investments Group  
IP Strategic Group  





SRI International  
Stanford TTO  
Tynax  
 TABLE 2. What brokers do 
 
COMPANY  MAIN ACTIVITY 
Capital Value Partners  Assisting buyers and sellers 
Inflexion Point   Consulting in licensing 
Intellectual Ventures   Patent portfolio builder 
IP Investments Group  Transaction and licensing services 
IP Strategic Group   IP Consulting 
IP Value Management  Licensing and patent transactions 
IPotential   Assisting buyers and sellers 
Mayo   Licensing in-licensing out 
Oceantomo  IP merchant banking 
Science+Technology   Business development from patents 
SRI International   Licensing-selling 
Stanford TTO   Licensing 
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